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Abstract 
 
The exclusivity conferred to inventors by intellectual property rights (IPRs) provide an ex 
ante incentive for innovation, but the resulting market power yields an ex post inefficiency 
(because it limits use of the innovation).  Strong IPRs may also affect innovation by limiting 
access of proprietary knowledge in research aimed at new inventions and discoveries, which 
raises the question of whether IPRs should have an experimental use or research exemption 
(RE) provision.  This chapter sets up a model to study some effects of a RE provision by 
comparing two IPR systems that are available for plants: utility patents and so-called plant 
breeders’ rights (PBRs), which in the USA are implemented by the 1970 Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA). Whereas PBRs allow for an RE, the US patent law does not have a 
statutory RE. 
 
The differences related to the RE provide the sharpest distinctions between patents 
and PBRs. The simple model and preliminary analysis presented in this chapter suggest 
that the RE inevitably weakens the ex ante incentive for private firms to innovate. Thus, 
when research is very costly and/or risky, as may be the case with pre-breeding germplasm 
development, an IPR system centred on the features of standard PBRs may not 
deliver the desired innovation incentive for private firms. Conversely, when research 
and development (R&D) costs are low, relative to the potential returns, the RE may be 
desirable because it ensures a larger pool of innovators in follow-up inventions. 
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1. Introduction 
Economics has long emphasized the market failures that beset the competitive provision of 
innovations (Arrow, 1962).  Creative and inventive activities produce intangible assets that 
can be quite costly to obtain, that may be extremely valuable to society at large, but that can 
be copied and/or imitated very easily.  Intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as patents, 
copyrights and trademarks—allowing the producers of new and/or original work to assert 
(limited) exclusive ownership on the outcome of their efforts—can provide a solution to the 
incentive problems that arise in this context.  But, the solution provided by IPRs displays a 
quintessential second-best nature (Langinier and Moschini, 2002).  Ex ante, the profit 
opportunities made possible by the exclusivity conferred by IPRs provide a critical incentive 
for private research and development (R&D) activities.  But ex post, because IPRs confer a 
degree of monopoly power, they introduce a novel source of distortions in the economy by 
restricting the use of innovations (which typically have the nature of a public good).  This 
leads to the basic trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency illustrated by Nordhaus 
(1969), which implies that weak IPRs may provide insufficient incentive, but strong IPRs 
may inefficiently restrict the use of an innovation.  Thus, the form and extent of the optimal 
IPR system is still an open question.   
 The fact that most innovations are not produced in isolation, but rather are often 
derived from the existing stock of possibly proprietary knowledge, adds a new dimension to 
the analysis of IPRs.  In particular, to provide adequate incentives for innovation, IPRs 
should offer protection not only from imitation but also from future inventions that will 
compete with the protected product (Scotchmer, 1991).  This is especially critical in a 
sequential and cumulative innovation context, such as that characterizing the case of 
biotechnology’s “research tools,” or the case when successive innovations can be viewed as a 
quality ladder.  The possibility of granting patents with a so-called leading breadth that is 
sufficiently large can, in principle, provide sufficient protection.  But then it is not clear 
whether the competitors’ research activities themselves, which in the case of cumulative 
innovation unavoidably rely on the use of existing (proprietary) knowledge, should be 
viewed as infringing.  To put it another way, the question is whether IPRs should 
contemplate a well-defined “experimental use” or “research exemption” provision.  Such a 
provision would clearly weaken the exclusivity conferred by IPRs, thereby affecting the 
incentive to innovate.  At the same time, it is quite plausible that restricting the 
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“experimental use” of proprietary technology could overly restrict future improvements on 
an innovation and be suboptimal from the social point of view.  So far there has been no 
systematic attempt to investigate this question and relate it to the relevant features of the 
specific cumulative research process under consideration.   
In this chapter we will focus on the research exemption to compare and contrast the 
innovation incentives provided to plant breeders by two alternative IPR instruments: utility 
patents, and so-called plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), which in the United States are 
implemented by the 1970 Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act.  PBRs allow the use of others’ 
proprietary germplasm when breeding new varieties. This research exemption provision 
stands in sharp contrast with the stronger type of protection granted by utility patents.  As 
was confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke, the U.S. 
patent law does not envision a statutory research exemption (Eisenberg, 2003).  Also, 
because the innovation process of interest (plant breeding) is a quintessential sequential 
endeavor, the dynamic incentive issues related to the availability of a research exemption (or 
lack thereof) take on a central role.  In what follows we first discuss the main features of 
PBRs and patent systems for the problem at hand.  The economic impacts of PVP have 
been the object of many empirical studies, which we briefly review.  The assessment that 
they yield is (perhaps inevitably) largely inconclusive.  This motivates us to pursue a more 
theoretical approach.  The simple model that we develop, rooted in the quality ladder models 
of sequential innovation, permits a first investigation of the different innovation incentives 
that flow from PVP and patent protection.  We find that the presence of a research 
exemption inevitably weakens the firms’ ex ante incentive to innovate. 
 
2.  Plant Breeders’ Rights, Patents, and the Research Exemption 
PBRs in the United States are defined by the 1970 PVP Act, whereby the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) can issue PVP certificates. Varieties claiming a PVP certificate must 
be new and must satisfy requirements of distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. The 
protection offered by PVP certificates is similar to that provided by patents, including the 
standard 20-year term, with two major qualifications: there is a research exemption, meaning 
that protected varieties may be used by others for research purposes (e.g., to develop other 
new varieties); and there is a “farmer’s privilege,” that is, seed of protected varieties can be 
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saved by farmers for their own replanting (but farmers are prohibited from reselling 
protected seeds).  
The international coordination of PBRs is the prerogative of the International Union 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV, after its French spelling). The latest 
UPOV convention (1991) allows countries to provide protection for new varieties with both 
PVP certificates and utility patents and allows (but does not require) countries to permit 
farmers to save protected seeds for replanting.  A major development with UPOV 1991 was 
the introduction of the notion of “essentially derived variety” (EDV).  The perceived 
problem, at the time, was the imbalance between the protection offered by patents and 
PBRs, in particular the interaction of the two modes.  Specifically, the developer of a 
patented transgenic trait (often a single gene transformation) would have the option of 
inserting it into others’ varieties covered by PBRs by way of the traditional research 
exemption, but, in turn, the owner of that variety could not access the trait-improved variety 
because of the patent on the trait (Roberts, 2002).  
The notion of EDV strengthens the rights of the initial variety owner by establishing 
that the principle that that his/her approval, and profit sharing, would be required for 
marketing the EDV (e.g., the initial variety plus the gene of interest).   Thus, the EDV 
notion is a significant development vis-à-vis the research exemption attribute of PBRs.  But 
it should be clear that the notion of EDV does not invalidate the standard breeders’ 
exemption, because no authorization whatsoever is required for using others’ varieties 
protected by PBRs (unlike what applies if the variety is patented) (Jördens, 2002).   
In addition to PBRs, plant innovators can rely on a few other instruments to assert 
their intellectual property, including trade secrets, the use of hybrids (provided parent lines 
can be protected), so-called genetic use restriction technologies (still under development), 
and specific contractual arrangements, such as the bag-label contracts that are common in 
the United States (Boettiger, VanDusen, Graff, Pardey, and Wright, 2004).  Perhaps most 
important, in the United States plant breeders can also protect their innovations by filing 
utility patents.  The landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
opened the door for patent rights for virtually any biologically based invention, if obtained 
through human intervention. And, in its 2001 ruling in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that plant seeds and plants themselves (both 
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traditionally bred or produced by genetic engineering) are patentable under U.S. law (Janis 
and Kesan, 2002).   
As noted earlier, the U.S. patent law does not have a statutory research exemption 
(apart from the provision governing pre-approval testing of generic drugs allowed for by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984).  An exception to patent infringement liability when the 
purpose of the activity is mere experimentation has long been thought to exist, but existing 
case law (culminating with the Madey v. Duke decision noted earlier) has made it clear that 
such a defense could only be construed very narrowly (Miller, 2003).  Hence, a plant breeder 
that elects to rely on patents can prevent others from using the protected germplasm in 
rivals’ breeding programs.  That is not possible when the protection is afforded by PVP 
certificates.  Of course, the standards for obtaining a patent are higher, in principle, because 
to be patentable an innovation must, among other things, be novel (not constituting part of 
the prior art) and involve an inventive step (i.e., it must be non-obvious), two attributes that are 
not required for PVP protection.   
The differences in the degrees of protection conferred by patents and PVPs for plant 
innovations are somewhat more challenging in an international context.  The drive to 
harmonize patent protection long pursued by the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
received a considerable boost by the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights) agreement of the World Trade Organization (Moschini, 2004). Yet, there is no 
uniformity across national jurisdictions with respect to the research exemption.  Some 
countries’ patent laws are like those of the United States in that they do not envision an 
explicit research exemption or experimental use exception for patents (e.g., Australia), 
whereas others do have an explicit recognition that some experimental use is allowed (e.g., 
Japan and the European Union) (Straus, 2002; Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, 
2004).   
Conversely, in many countries the main available protection for plant innovations is 
offered by PBRs.  Indeed, under TRIPS it is not mandatory for a signatory country to offer 
patent protection for plant and animal innovations, as long as a sui generis system is available.  
Thus, elsewhere in the world, access to patents for plant innovations is often not available 
(Otten, 2003).  That is certainly the case for most developing countries, where PBRs, in the 
blueprint provided by UPOV, are more commonly used for plant varieties.  But even in 
European countries, where plant innovations are included in the patentable subject matter, 
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somewhat anachronistically, plant varieties per se are explicitly not patentable by the statute of 
the European Patent Office (Fleck and Baldock, 2003). 
 Given that patents and PBRs appear to offer a different level of IPR protection, and 
that the possibility for plant breeders to avail themselves of either protection differs across 
countries, it is of foremost interest to ascertain the differences in innovation incentives that 
countries offer.  
 
2.1 The Economic Effects of Plant Breeders’ Rights 
The question of whether the PVP Act has had a positive effect on the breeding efforts and 
quality of new plant varieties in the United States has received a lot of attention in the 
literature. One of the first studies in this area was the one conducted by Perrin, Hunnings, 
and Ihnen (1983). These authors conducted a 1980 survey of 127 seed companies designed 
to obtain data on research expenditures from 1960 to 1979 for the purpose of investigating 
increases in the research expenditures on non-hybrid crops after the enactment of the PVP 
Act. It turned out that there was a moderate increase in investment in soybeans and cereals 
in that period, which was, however, substantially smaller than the increase in expenditures in 
the hybrid corn sector, even though hybrid varieties were not protected under the PVP Act. 
This study also used soybean variety test results from the mid-1960s up to 1979 to see if 
there was an impact on the rate of improvement in yields of soybean varieties. A positive but 
not statistically significant effect was found.  
Butler and Marion (1985) combined a survey of breeders with data on PVP 
certificates and found that the PVP Act had had an impact on private investment only in 
wheat and soybeans, while public investment did not change. In a follow-up study, Butler 
(1996) reached a similar conclusion, which was once again confirmed in a USDA (1995) 
study of new crop varieties. Additionally, the study documented an increase in both PVP 
certificates and utility patents for new plants starting in the early 1970s. 
In a more recent study, Alston and Venner (2002) investigated whether the PVP Act 
had a positive effect on wheat breeding efforts. Results of their survey suggest that 
investment in wheat breeding remained at the same level before and after introduction of the 
PVP Act. They also found no evidence of an increase in wheat yields throughout the period. 
An interesting analysis of PVP in an international context is given in Srinivasan 
(2004). This paper uses data on grants of PVP certificates in a cross-section of 13 developed 
 7 
countries observed over periods of up to nine years to investigate whether stronger IPRs for 
plant varieties lead to higher R&D expenditures and PVP grants, and if stronger PVP 
protection leads to significant exchange of plant varieties between countries. The analysis 
suggests that stronger IPRs will increase R&D and PVP grants. Hence, there might be a 
positive effect of strengthening protection in countries with weaker IPRs in this area. As to 
international transferability of varieties, it is at its highest level within Europe, where 
significant harmonization of PVP regimes has taken place. The same author (Srinivasan 
2003) used PVP renewal data from selected European countries to estimate the private 
values of holding a PVP certificate on a new variety. It turned out that the distribution of 
private values is quite skewed, with a large number of certificates yielding no return to their 
owners. Also, for new agricultural crops the mean private value of a PVP certificate ranged 
from $156 in the Netherlands to around $1,364 in Germany, suggesting that the value of 
PVP protection to private breeders is moderate at best. 
There is a separate strand in this literature that attempts to investigate the economic 
effect on plant breeding of the so-called farmer’s privilege. For example, Pray and Basant 
(1999) conducted interviews with Indian breeders and found that the farmers’ privilege has a 
significant negative effect on the appropriation rate of economic benefits of new varieties. 
Hansen and Knudson (1996) developed a model for testing whether seed suppliers try to 
capture some of the benefits from future saved seed by pricing their varieties accordingly 
and found statistically significant evidence of such appropriation in the soybean market. 
They conclude that the farmers’ privilege does not decrease the incentives to invest in 
development of new varieties or their improvements. 
In conclusion, the foregoing empirical studies provide scant empirical evidence on 
the hypothesis that the PVP Act had a positive effect on plant breeding in the United States. 
However, these findings are not conclusive because of the nature of the studies that 
delivered them. It is by no means clear that these studies have controlled for all variables that 
can potentially influence plant genetic improvement in the long run. The main difficulty in 
evaluating the effects of the PVP Act, which has not been overcome in the empirical 
literature, is the impossibility of disentangling the impact of the PVP Act from the many 
potential confounding factors that may work in either direction.  In particular, in these 
empirical studies it is unclear whether the alternative to PBRs ought to be construed as one 
with weaker IPR protection (e.g., no IPRs for plants) or one of stronger IPR protection (e.g., 
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patents instead of PBRs).  The former seems to be, at least implicitly, the hypothesis of many 
of the earlier analyses, but the latter is arguably the more pressing policy question (as 
emphasized by the current TRIPS debate that contrasts sui generis systems with a patent 
system).   
In any event, it is clear that the extant empirical evidence does not address the 
problem at hand, i.e., the possible different strengths of the incentive to innovate provided 
by PBRs and patents.  To gain some insight into the effects of the research exemption, 
therefore, we now turn to a theoretical analysis. 
 
3.  Modeling Cumulative and Sequential Innovations 
The recognition that inventions are typically the springboard for further innovations has 
long been noted in the analysis of the economics of IPRs (Scotchmer, 1991).  When 
innovation is cumulative, the first inventor will not necessarily be compensated for his 
contribution to the social value created by the subsequent inventions, which adds another 
dimension to the task of designing an efficient IPR regime. Scotchmer (2004) distinguishes 
between three main types of cumulativeness of the innovation process: (i) an initial 
innovation leading to several next-generation innovations; (ii) a higher-level innovation that 
requires several first-generation innovations as inputs, and (iii) a quality-ladder innovation 
process in which each invention builds on the previous generation of the same product and 
serves as a basis for further improvements. 
 The theoretical models of cumulative innovation follow roughly the same taxonomy 
and can be viewed as belonging to the two broad classes. The first class is represented by 
two-period models that are meant to capture the first two types of cumulativeness. These 
models typically deal with the problem of the transfer of profits from successful application 
of a given patented innovation to the original inventor(s). The second class is comprised of 
models that attempt to model the quality ladder type innovation process in the explicitly 
dynamic setup. 
 One of the first models to analyze the division of profits between the first- and 
second-generation inventors was Green and Scotchmer (1995). The main question addressed 
in the paper is how patent breadth and patent length should be set in order to allow the first 
inventor to cover his cost, subject to the constraint that the second-generation innovation is 
profitable. The optimal policy depends on the type of licensing agreements available, but in 
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general the model implies that patents should last longer when the firms pursuing the first 
and second innovations are different (as opposed to the case in which a single firm develops 
both innovations).     
 In Scotchmer 1996, the focus is again on the division of profits between creators of a 
basic invention and those who apply it: if the application infringes on prior art, can patenting 
be optimal from the social point of view? The paper argues that it cannot, because in that 
case the second inventor has less bargaining power when negotiating a licensing agreement 
with the patent holder, who in turn is more willing to invest in research and develop the 
basic invention. A similar problem was studied by Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett (1996). In 
this paper the authors similarly argue that the first-generation inventor should be given 
enough incentives to innovate. In particular, it might make sense to give the inventor an 
exclusive right to develop a particular application of her invention, while all other 
applications can be developed and patented by other firms. The second type of 
cumulativeness, when several first-generation products give rise to the single application, is 
exemplified by special types of inventions called research tools.  These are inventions that 
derive their market value from their use in applied research. The problem of division of 
profit in this context is discussed in Koo and Wright (2002). 
 Most of the models previously mentioned seem to provide theoretical support for 
strong patent protection when innovation is cumulative. There are however some notable 
exceptions in the literature. In particular, Denicolò (2000) has shown that if one allows for 
R&D races in each of the two periods (as opposed to assuming that each firm can have at 
most one idea) and rules out the possibility of ex ante agreements, one can obtain a different 
conclusion. His model emphasizes the fact that the cumulative nature of the invention 
process results in the divergence between social and private payoffs from innovation, which 
in the absence of ex ante sharing agreements would make the case for strong forward 
protection less appealing. Denicolò and Zanchettin (2002) compare two tools for providing 
forward protection, the novelty requirement and leading breadth (the minimum size of 
quality improvement that makes a follow-on innovation non-infringing), and conclude that 
the leading breadth requirement is, in general, more conducive to the invention process than 
the novelty requirement, which gives too much blocking power to the first inventor. 
The second class of models deals with dynamic models of repeated innovation in 
which each firm will periodically assume the role of follower or leader. Hence, the main 
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question here is not the division of profits between first and second innovators but rather 
how to increase total profits while minimizing monopoly distortions. O’Donoghue, 
Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998) present a model of cumulative innovation in which firms 
sequentially improve each other’s products. The main object of their analysis is leading 
breadth—protection against new, improved products.   The authors show that zero leading 
breadth will lead to underinvestment in R&D from the social point of view; that is, only 
innovations of a relatively larger size are implemented, while it would be socially optimal to 
implement smaller innovations as well. This result is due to the short expected life of the 
patent, since any new innovation will take over the market when the leading breadth 
requirement is absent from the model.  
Another model of this type is described in O’Donoghue 1998, the main focus of 
which is the patentability requirement—the minimum threshold innovation size required to 
receive a patent (see also Hunt, 2004). This should be contrasted with leading breadth, in 
which a patent can be obtained but then the patentee must obtain a license. The conclusion 
of this study is similar to the one reached in O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998), 
namely, that the patentability requirement can stimulate R&D investment and increase 
dynamic social welfare. 
 
4.  A Model of Cumulative Innovation for Plant Breeding 
The model of research exemptions that we want to construct is related to the second strand 
in the literature previously discussed. In particular, we want to construct a simple model of 
innovation that captures some salient features of plant breeding.  Plant breeding is a lengthy 
and risky endeavor that consists of “… developing new varieties through the creation of new 
genetic diversity by the reassembling of existing diversity…” (International Seed Federation, 
2003).  Thus, the process is both sequential and cumulative, because new varieties would 
seek to maintain the desirable features of the ones they are based on while adding new 
attributes.  As such, a critical input in this process is the starting germplasm, and that in turn 
is critically affected by whether or not one has access to the successful varieties of others, 
that is, whether or not there is a research exemption.  But in a dynamic context, of course, 
the quality of the existing germplasm is itself the result of (previous) breeding decisions, and 
so it is directly affected by the features of the IPR regime in place.  Industry views on the 
matter highlight the possibility that freer access to others’ germplasm will create little 
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incentive for pre-breeding germplasm enhancement, such as widening the germplasm 
diversity base by introducing exotic germplasm (Donnenwirth, Grace, and Smith, 2004).   
In the stylized model that we consider in this paper, we imagine two firms that are 
competing to develop a new variety along a particular development trajectory.  At time zero 
both firms have access to the same germplasm and, upon investing an amount c , achieve 
success with probability p .  Thus the R&D process is costly and risky.  Given one success, 
the firms then have the option to pursue the next improvement, again upon paying an initial 
cost c  and with a probability p  of a successful outcome for each firm.  Whether or not both 
firms can attack the next innovation stage depends on the IPR regime (which we define 
subsequently).  But, following Bessen and Maskin (2002), we assume that each firm’s 
outcome is independent of the other and that whenever both firms fail to achieve the next 
innovation no further innovation is possible.  Note that we are thus capturing the sequential 
nature of plant breeding, as well as the notion of what breeders sometimes call “path 
dependency” (Donnenwirth, Grace, and Smith, 2004), whereby successive improvements 
along a given path greatly benefit from the initial breakthrough.    
Each successful innovation embeds all previous ones, thus reflecting the fact that 
breeding is a cumulative process whereby each new variety builds on the previous ones, and 
it is worth an additional Δ , per period, to society.  What a success is worth to the innovator, 
however, depends on the IPR regime and on the possible constraining effects of 
competition among innovators.  We make the simplifying assumption that only the best 
product is sold in this market, but what the owner can charge is the marginal value over what 
the competitor can offer (i.e., we assume Bertrand competition).  For example, if two firms 
have achieved n  and m  innovation steps, respectively, with m n> , the firm with m  steps 
will be the one selling any product and will make an ex post per-period profit of ( )m n− Δ .   
As for IPRs, here we consider two regimes.  For simplicity, the protection offered by both 
IPR regimes lasts forever (the more realistic alternative of a finite patent life adds nothing to 
the economic analysis but would make the exposition more cumbersome). The first regime, 
labeled as “full patent” (FP), does not allow a research exemption.  The second regime, 
labeled “research exemption” (RE), allows it (thus, the RE regime reflects the attributes of a 
PBR system).  
Our ultimate goal is to compare incentives to innovate in an industry consisting of 
two firms and characterized by these two distinct IPR modes of protection.  However, 
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before proceeding to the direct comparison of these regimes, it is useful to analyze the 
incentive to innovate for a firm that has no competitors. This special case is useful in what 
follows, and also allows us to introduce the rest of the notation and the method of analysis.  
Thus, let 0MV  denote the present expected value (at time zero) of the flow of profits to the 
(monopolist) firm.  Assuming that the firm invests in every period in which it has an 
investment opportunity (i.e., after each successful innovation), 0MV  satisfies the following 
recursive relation: 
0 01
M MV c p Vδδ
Δ⎛ ⎞
= − + +⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠  
where (0,1)δ ∈  denotes the discount factor ( 1 (1 )rδ ≡ + , say, where r  is the interest rate), 
such that we have 
 0
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
M p cV
p
δ
δ δ
Δ − −
=
− −
 
Note that the present value 0MV  is positive if and only if  
 (1 ) Mtc p
δΔ −
> ≡ .  
Also, if this condition holds, the firm will choose to invest in every period.   
 
4.1  Patent Protection Mode 
As noted, we assume that patents are of infinite length and with breadth defined by the 
innovation step (worth Δ ).  If the two firms (firm A and firm B, say) both invest c  at time 
zero, four possible outcomes are possible: only firm A is successful, only firm B is 
successful, both are successful, and neither is successful.  If neither succeeds, the R&D 
contest ends.  If both succeed, priority is assigned randomly with equal probability to either 
firm, such that we have a unique winner of the first stage of the R&D contest.  With the full 
patent protection, we assume that the winner of the first stage is the only one that can attack 
the next research stages.  As with Bessen and Maskin (2002), a critical assumption for this 
characterization is that licensing is not possible.  Hence, the first firm to obtain a patent will 
become a monopolist starting from date one (from which the previous present-value 
discussion therefore applies). This implies that at time zero both firms will race to obtain this 
dominant position. 
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When both firms are involved in the first-stage R&D contest, the probability that 
either one is the sole winner is 2(1 ) 0.5q p p p p≡ − + < .  In such a situation, a firm that 
invests in the first period, and keeps investing if it is the winner of that stage as long as there 
is an investment opportunity, has a present value 0FPV  that satisfies 
0 01
FP MV c q Vδδ
Δ⎛ ⎞
= − + +⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠  
Thus, we have 
2
0
(2 ) (1 )(2 )
2(1 )(1 )
FP p p c pV
p
δ δ
δ δ
Δ − − − −
=
− −
 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, both firms will invest in period zero if 0 0FPV ≥ , that 
is, if  
 
2(1 )(2 )
(2 ) FP
p
t
c p p
δ δ− −Δ
≥ ≡
−
 
Note that FP Mt t> ; that is, competition to be the only firm in the industry in period one 
dissipates some of the incentive to innovate in period zero by lowering the probability of 
reaching stage one.  Also, whenever FPc tΔ ≥ , so that both firms invest in the initial 
investment game, then Mc tΔ > .  Hence, the firm that wins the initial innovation contest 
(thereby becoming a monopolist) will keep investing in follow-up improvements (as 
assumed in the derivation of 0FPV ).  If M FPt c t< Δ <  then there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria (a firm will invest provided the other does not) and, perhaps more interesting, 
there is also a (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each firm randomizes 
between investment and no investment (and earns a zero expected initial payoff).    
 
4.2  Research Exemption Mode 
Introducing research exemption in this model is equivalent to making any innovation 
(improvement of the existing product or variety) non-infringing. In such a situation a success 
by any one of the firms is a sufficient condition for both firms to be able to invest in the 
next period.  In what follows we present a simplified analysis by assuming that only two 
strategies are available to each firm: invest in every period (I) and never invest (N). In other 
words, each firm can either enter the market and try to innovate in each period or stay out of 
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the market altogether.  Let  0, ( , )RE A BjV s s  denote the payoff (as of period zero) to firm j  
( ,j A B= ) when the two firms choose strategies ( , )A Bs s  in every period at which there is an 
investment opportunity. Clearly, 0, 0, 0( , ) ( , )RE RE MA BV I N V N I V= = , 0, ( , ) 0
RE
jV N N =  ( ,j A B= ), 
0, 0,( , ) ( , ) 0
RE RE
B AV I N V N I= = , and 0, 0, 0( , ) ( , )RE RE REA BV I I V I I V= ≡ . That is, a firm that chooses to 
stay out of the R&D contest gets a payoff of zero, and a firm that enters the competition 
alone gets the monopolist’s payoff 0MV  calculated earlier.  Finally, when both firms engage 
in R&D at every date at which there is a research opportunity, then they each have the same 
expected present value, which is labeled 0REV . 
 Even with our simplifying assumption that firms use the same strategy in every period, 
the characterization of  0REV  is not straightforward.  This is because the return to a “success” 
depends on where the rival stands on the ladder of quality improvements.  For example, the 
winner of the first innovation stage (firm A, say) can charge Δ  (because that is all that the 
innovation is worth).  But under the RE regime both firms can then participate in the next 
innovation stage.  If firm A wins the second stage as well, then this firm can charge 2Δ  for 
the (twice improved) product.  But if it is firm B that wins the second stage, this firm can 
charge only Δ  because of our Bertrand competition assumption (given that firm A still owns 
the first innovation).  Hence, what each firm can expect to earn in each period depends on 
two state variables (the highest number of innovation steps patented by the two firms), and 
as the time horizon progresses there is an infinite number of configurations of these state 
variables, the probability distribution of which is implicitly defined by the initial stochastic 
assumptions (each firm has an independent probability of success equal to p ). 
Accounting for the number of all possible histories leading to a particular state 
configuration ( , )m n , where m  and n  denote the highest number of innovation steps 
achieved by firms A and B, respectively, it is possible to obtain the present value of the 
stream of expected profit of the two firms.  The derivation of this result is somewhat lengthy 
and it is omitted.  But it can be shown that the present value 0REV  can be written as 
( ) ( )0 (1 ) 1 1 2
RE q cV
q qδ δ δ
Δ
= −
− − −
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where, again, 22 1 (1 )q p p⎡ ⎤≡ − − >⎣ ⎦  is the probability that at least one firm is successful in a 
given stage. 
From the initial (time zero) perspective, the R&D investment contest in which each 
firm chooses between I and N can be represented as a static game with the payoff matrix 
given in Table 1.   Several Nash equilibria are possible here.  First, ( , )I I  is a Nash 
equilibrium if 0 0REV ≥ .  Second, ( , )I N  and ( , )N I  are both Nash equilibria if  0 0REV ≤  and 
0 0
MV ≥ ,  Finally, ( , )N N  is a Nash equilibrium if 0 0MV ≤ .  Note that  0 0REV ≥  holds if and 
only if 
 ( )( )
(1 ) 1
1 2 RE
q
t
c q q
δ δ
δ
− −Δ ≥ ≡
−
.  
Thus, the equilibrium of the static game as previously defined will depend on the value of 
the benefit-cost ratio cΔ . If cΔ  is such that  0 Mc t< Δ < , no firm will invest. If 
M REt c t< Δ <  then there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (I, N) and (N, I) (and also a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each firm randomizes between I and N, earning the 
expected initial payoff of zero). Finally, if REt c< Δ , the unique Nash equilibrium is (I, I) 
with both firms receiving a payoff equal to 0REV . 
  Because 0.5 (2 )q p p p= − < , it is verified that the threshold levels derived in the 
foregoing satisfy the following inequalities: 
 0 M FP REt t t< < < . 
Based on these inequalities we can already conclude that the RE mode provides weaker ex 
ante incentives to invest than does the FP regime.  That is, for a given R&D cost c , there is a 
range of the benefit parameter Δ  where the FP regime can support two firms in the (initial) 
R&D contest, each earning positive returns, whereas the RE mode cannot.  Specifically, this 
outcome happens whenever FP REt c t< Δ < .  
 Furthermore, from the ex ante payoff formulae derived earlier we also conclude that  
( ) ( )
0 0
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
FP REq qV V
p qδ δ δ δ
∂ ∂
= > =
∂Δ − − − − ∂Δ
 
Thus, not only does the FP model provide an R&D incentive for a range of Δ  where the 
RE mode does not, but the ex ante returns to the firms increase faster with Δ  under FP than 
under RE.  In other words, 0 0FP REV V≥ , where the inequality holds strictly whenever 
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FPc tΔ > .  Hence, in our setting a firm would never prefer weaker patent protection over 
stronger patent protection (unlike what may happen, for example, in the Bessen and Maskin, 
2002, framework).  This result, illustrated in Figure 1, shows the behavior of the firms’ ex 
ante expected profit for a range of the benefit/cost ratios.  
 We should note, before closing, that some limitations of our simplified analysis are 
readily apparent.  Specifically, our identification of Nash equilibria does not address the 
question of whether such equilibria are “subgame perfect.”  In other words, limiting our 
consideration to strategies that entail the same action at every period in which there is an 
investment opportunity is, admittedly, restrictive.  Whereas this limitation of the analysis can 
be overcome, the more rigorous game-theoretic approach that is required is not pursued 
here but is left for future research.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
In the United States, IPR protection for plants can be secured through either utility patents 
or protection certificates under the PVP Act of 1970.  A crucial difference between these 
two modes of protection concerns the so-called research exemption: PVP certificates allow 
it, whereas patents do not.  When innovation is sequential and cumulative, as is the case in 
plant breeding, the economic implications of the research exemption are not completely 
understood. The simple model and preliminary analysis presented in this paper suggest that 
the research exemption inevitably weakens the ex ante incentive for private firms to innovate.  
Although in this paper we have not explicitly considered the welfare implications, from 
society’s perspective, of the two modes of protection analyzed, the private incentive effects 
that we have uncovered allow some interesting conclusions.  When R&D costs are low, 
relative to the potential returns, the reduced incentives may be immaterial, and the research 
exemption may be desirable because it ensures a larger pool of innovators for follow-up 
inventions.  But when research is relatively costly and/or risky, as is arguably the case with 
pre-breeding germplasm development, an IPR system centered on the features of standard 
PBRs (i.e., allowing for a fairly liberal research exemption) does not deliver the desired 
innovation incentive for private firms.    
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Table 1. Payoff matrix of the R&D game with a “research exemption” 
 
  Firm B 
  I N 
I 0 0,RE REV V  0 , 0MV  
Firm A 
N 00 , MV  0 , 0  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Ex ante payoff to firms under the two IPR regimes  
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